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The CroaTIaN SeCTIoN of The 
CommUNIST ParTy of The UNITeD STaTeS 
aND The “UNITeD froNT”: 1934-1939
John KRALJIC*
Introduction
Immigrants dominated the Communist Party of the United States (CPUSA) 
during long periods of its existence.1 Despite this, relatively little has been 
written concerning the activities of the score of organized foreign language or 
national groups within the CPUSA.2 Whether due to lack of access to resources 
or language barriers, the failure to study the activities of these groups leaves a 
hole in the understanding of the activities of the CPUSA.
The South Slavs, and particularly the Croats, represented one of the largest 
ethnic groups in the CPUSA.3 The South Slavic Language Federation of the 
Socialist Party of America (SPA) had been one of the seven major groups which 
established the Communist Party of America (CPA), one of the precursors of 
the CPUSA. During one of the CPUSA’s nadirs in late 1920s, an estimated one-
1  Concerning the history of the CPUSA during the 1930s, see Harvey Klehr, The Heyday of 
American Communism: The Depression Decade (New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1984); 
and Fraser Ottanelli, The Communist Party of the United States From the Depression to World 
War II (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1991).
2    On the Hungarians, see the memoirs of Sandor Voros, American Commissar (Philadelphia: 
Chilton Co., 1961). On the Finns, see Peter Kivisto, Immigrant Socialists in the United States : The 
case of Finns and the Left (Rutherford, NJ: Farleigh Dickinson University Press, 1984). On the 
Italians, see Gerald Meyer, “Italian Americans and the American Communist Party,” in Phillip 
V. Cannistraro and Gerald Meyer, eds., The Lost World of Italian American Radicalism: Politics, 
Labor, and Culture (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003).
3    The history of the Croatian American community has been studied by a number of scholars, 
including: Gerald Gilbert Govorchin, Americans From Yugoslavia (Gainesville: University of 
Florida Press, 1961); George J. Prpic, The Croatian Immigrants in America (New York: Philo-
sophical Library, 1971); and Ivan Čizmić, Hrvati u životu Sjedinjenih američkih država (Zagreb: 
Globus, 1982).
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third to one-half of the Party’s membership consisted of Yugoslav-Americans,4 
the great majority of them Croats.5
While Croatian-American Communists did not have such a large relative 
presence in the Party in the 1930s, during the later half of that decade they 
played an increasingly visible role within their own community. This period 
coincided with the Great Depression, Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s “New Deal,” 
and unionization drives in, among others, the steel, mining and automobile 
industries where Croatian-Americans represented a measurable proportion of 
the workforce. Croatian-Americans and their most important organization, the 
Croatian Fraternal Union (CFU), played prominent parts in these ultimately 
successful union campaigns.
Croatian-American Communists were a driving force in these unionization 
drives in their community and became ubiquitous in political activities among 
Croatian-Americans generally. Importantly, their expansive work in this regard 
during the second half of the 1930s had been initiated not on their own accord 
but as a result of the implementation of decisions taken by the Communist 
International (Comintern) at its VIIth Congress in Moscow in August and 
September 1935.6
At that Congress, the Comintern determined to undertake a radical 
shift in tactics by adopting a revised version of the “United Front” and a new 
“Popular Front.” The updated “United” and new “Popular Fronts” represented 
a marked break from the so-called “Third Period” tactics of prior years when 
the Comintern condemned coalitions with non-Communist leftists and 
declared western Social Democracy to be Communism’s primary enemy.7 The 
4   Ivan Očak, Jugoslavenski emigranti iz Amerike u Sovjetskom Savezu (izmedju dva rata) (Za-
greb: Spektar, 1985), p. 17. At least one participant in the movement has noted, however, that 
these numbers did not necessarily reflect the strength of the movement within the immigrant 
community but of the weakness of the CPUSA. Srđan Prica, Amerika (1937-1945) (Sarajevo: 
NIŠRO Oslobođenje, 1988), p.18.
5   Their influence extended into the ranks of the Party’s leadership. One study of the ethnic 
composition of 212 Central Committee members found 6 born in the former Yugoslavia; only 
those born in Russia and Poland registered greater numbers. Harvey Klehr, Communist Cadre: 
The Social Background of the American Communist Party Elite (Stanford: Hoover Institution 
Press), 1978, p. 27.
6   The Comintern had been created after the Bolshevik takeover of Russia as a means to coordi-
nate the work of sister Communist Parties of Soviet Russia. However, soon after its creation, the 
Comintern became an instrument of control over these Parties by the Soviet Union.
7   According to the Comintern, the “First Period” represented an era of revolutionary activism 
prompted by the Bolshevik Revolution. During the “Second Period,” the capitalist world had 
stabilized itself after having withstood the onslaught of the Bolshevik takeover. The Comintern 
forecast that the “Third Period” would be a renewed revolutionary era with capitalism facing its 
greatest crises. In anticipation of this new revolutionary upsurge, Communists were to “ “ready 
the workers for the impending fight for power, for the dictatorship of the proletariat.” ” Klehr, 
The Heyday, p. 12 (quoting from a resolution of the Comintern).
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emergence of fascism, rather than posing a threat, represented an opportunity. 
“Since fascism was the last stage of capitalism, it was a transient society . . . 
[and] could be disregarded as a serious factor in the onward march of [C]
ommunism.”8 But, Hitler’s rise to power and his destruction of the Communist 
Party of Germany, the largest outside the Soviet Union, caused the Comintern 
to abandon these failed policies. The USSR now sought alliances with Great 
Britain and France while its satellite Communist Parties received directives to 
build coalitions with non-fascist parties within the Western democracies.
The Comintern”s new tactics called upon Communist Parties to “take 
into consideration the changed circumstances and apply the [U]nited [F]ront 
tactics in a new manner, by seeking to reach agreements with the organizations 
of the toilers of various political trends [e.g., the Social Democrats] for joint 
action on a factory, local, district, national and international scale.”9
The Comintern further promoted a new tactic, coalitions among non-
leftist, but anti-fascist, parties. In contrast to the proletarian-based “United 
Front,” this new “Popular Front,” “People’s Front” or “Democratic Front” was 
to include “peasants, petit bourgeoisie, intellectuals - all in fact who accepted 
the program of anti-fascism.”10
These changes did not mark a turn by the Communists toward social 
democracy. Comintern head Georgi Dimitrov specifically denied at its VIIth 
Congress that “the [P]eople’s [F]ront was a transitional form to socialism 
and Communism that would make unnecessary a ‘proletarian’ revolution.”11 
The change instituted by the Congress, as enunciated by Dimitrov, merely 
redefined “the tactics and not the strategy of the Comintern. . . .  [T]here was 
nothing in [Dimitrov’s] address which challenged the universal applicability of 
the Bolshevik model of revolution.”12
Nevertheless, the Communists’ changed tactics brought relief to many in 
the West who wanted Communist and Soviet support as a bulwark against 
Nazism and fascism. It also allowed the Communists to support left-leaning 
governments, as in France and in Spain.
8    Daniel Bell, “Marxian Socialism in the United States,” in Donald Drew Egbert and Stow 
Persons, eds., Socialism and American Life (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1952), 
vol. 1, p. 351.
9   Jane Degras, ed., The Communist International 1919-1943 – Documents (London: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1965), vol. 3, pp. 361-62. The various Comintern changes on the “United Front” 
have been discussed in a number of works, including Kermit E. McKenzie, Comintern and World 
Revolution 1928-1943: The Shaping of Doctrine (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964); 
and Kevin McDermott and Jeremy Agnew, The Comintern: A History of International Commu-
nism From Lenin to Stalin (London: Macmillan Press, 1996).
10   McKenzie, Comintern, p. 154.
11   Ibid., p. 158.
12   McDermott and Agnew, The Comintern, pp. 132-33. 
J. KRALJIC, The Croatian section of the communist party of the united states...
140
The CPUSA remained a minor political party during the second half of the 
1930s. Still, the new “United Front” tactics led to an increase in its popularity. 
“After years in the political wilderness, Communists won respectability after 
1935 by blending into the liberal mainstream. They were found in every sector 
of American life . . . .”13
This article will examine the attempted implementation of the “United 
Front” within the Croatian-American community. After tracing the 
development of Socialist and Communist organizations in the community in 
the period until the mid-1930s, we will discuss vital changes which led to the 
establishment of a Croatian Section of the CPUSA and then we shall relate 
how the Section interacted with other, non-Communist Croatian-American 
groups in its efforts to create a “United Front.”
Croatian Immigrants and the Communist Party of the United States 
of america
activities Prior to 1934 
The Communist movement among Croatian-Americans has its roots 
in the pre-World War I period when radical influences permeated Croatian 
immigrant settlements in the factory and mining towns of Pennsylvania, Ohio, 
West Virginia and Illinois.14
While Croats had established socialist clubs in Pittsburgh as early as 1903, 
the socialist movement among them began to gain ground starting in 1907 
when Croatian-Serb Milan Glumac (1884-1914) began publication in Chicago 
of the bi-monthly and later weekly newspaper, Radnička straža.15 That same 
year saw the establishment of a number of Croatian socialist clubs in Chicago 
13   Klehr, The Heyday, p. xi.
14   This discussion concerning the growth of Socialist influence among Croatian and other Yu-
goslav immigrants prior to the formation of the CPUSA is based on information found in the 
following sources: Stojan Kesić, “Odnosi između jugoslovenskih radničkih društava u inostran-
stvu do 1914. godine,” in Iseljeništvo naroda i narodnosti Jugoslavije i njegove uzajamne veze s 
domovinom (Zagreb: Zavod za migracije i narodnosti, 1978), pp. 472-86; Ivan Čizmić, “Yugoslav 
Immigrants in the U.S. Labor Movement, 1880-1920,” in Dirk Hoerder, ed., American Labor 
and Immigration History, 1877-1920s: Recent European Research (Chicago: University of Illinois 
Press, 1983), pp. 177-90; and David Montgomery, “Nationalism, American Patriotism and Class 
Consciousness Among Immigrant Workers in the United States in the Epoch of World War I,” 
in Dirk Hoerder, ed., Struggle, A Hard Battle (DeKalb, Il: Northern Illinois University Press, 
1986), pp. 327-51. 
15   Concerning Glumac, see generally Luka Marković, Borba u iseljeništvu za novu Jugoslaviji 
(Beograd: Izdavački centar Komunist, 1975).
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while another Croatian language socialist paper, Radnička borba, began 
publication in Cleveland.
At a conference on 3 and 4 July 1910, South Slavic socialists in the United 
States established the South Slavic Socialist Federation (SSSF). Under Glumac’s 
influence, most delegates at the conference agreed to affiliate with the SPA, 
though a minority led by Radnička borba opted to follow Daniel DeLeon”s 
Socialist Labor Party (SLP).16
World War I saw a further split in the SSSF, mostly along ethnic lines. While 
practically all Slovenian and most Serbian socialists generally supported the 
Allied war effort, Croatian-American and some Serbian-American socialists 
followed the SPA’s anti-war line. As a result of this split, the SSSF came 
under Croat dominance. Following the end of the War, the Federation with 
approximately 2,200 members, came into the fold of the CPA.17
The CPA’s legal arm, the Workers’ Party of the USA, placed its Yugoslav 
immigrant members into a South Slavic Section which published its own 
newspaper, Znanje.18 While the Section initially had some modicum of 
independence, the Party’s 1925 reorganization (implemented under a policy 
known as “Bolshevization”) eliminated its autonomy as well as those of other 
foreign-language sections. No longer did the foreign-born members belong 
and pay dues to ethnic sections. They, together with American-born members, 
were placed in factory or geographically determined “units.” The CPUSA 
created “language fractions” within these units to ease communication among 
foreign-born members. The now memberless sections limited their activities 
to publishing newspapers in various foreign languages. A bureau headed 
16   Established in 1877, the SLP advocated the implementation of socialism through the electoral 
process while rejecting all compromises with the bourgeoisie. The SLP’s South Slavic Socialist 
Labor Party Federation appears to have mainly consisted of Serbs from Vojvodina and Banat. 
Based in Cleveland, they published numerous brochures and two annual almanacs. Čizmić, 
Hrvati u životu, p. 181. They continued to publish Radnička borba until 1970 when the SLP elim-
inated its language federations. “Rastanak s Radničkom borbom,” in Radnička borba, 8 October 
1970, p. 2. A split of some kind occurred in the ranks of the SLP Federation in the late 1920s 
when a new organization was established, the Industrijalni radnički savez (Industrial Workers 
League). The author has not been able to determine the cause of the rupture but it gave rise to 
another leftist newspaper serving the Croatian and Serbian communities, Industrijalist (The In-
dustrialist) which appeared in Detroit in 1928 and continued to publish until at least 1938 under 
the editorship of Svetislav Kontrin. One of the leaders of the organization (also known as the 
IRO) included Weselin (Veselin) Mijatov whose name appears in the Croatian-American press 
of the time. Ivan Mladineo, Narodni adresar Hrvata-Slovenaca- Srba (New York: Ivan Mladineo, 
1937), pp. 32 & 317. See also Čizmić, Hrvati u životu, p. 226.
17   Theodore Draper, The Roots of American Communism (New York: The Viking Press, 1957), 
pp. 158-59 and p. 189.
18   Čizmić, Hrvati u životu, p. 211.
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each section, led by a secretary responsible to the CPUSA”s Central Executive 
Committee.19 The Party’s 1925 reorganization also resulted in a new organization: 
foreign-language workers’ clubs which included non-Communists. The 
Communists assured their control over the clubs through “Party fractions,” 
units which took unified positions on all issues of importance.20
The reorganized Yugoslav Section’s newspaper now appeared under the 
name Radnik while Yugoslav Workers’ Clubs were soon found in many South 
Slav immigrant communities and a first national conference of these Clubs 
took place in Cleveland in September 1933.21
The reasons Croatian-Americans joined and remained members of the 
CPUSA are varied and complex. Their social conditions may have caused 
receptiveness to radical ideas. “Crammed together in coal and mill towns, often 
boarding in groups of seven or eight to a house, these workers were mostly 
single men without much family responsibility, and they dared to join radical 
outfits that guys with big families hesitated to approach. It was especially 
among these young single Croatians that radicalism caught on. The presence 
of pro-labor Croatian leaders, including newspaper editors and even an 
occasional priest, also fostered a left-wing consciousness among the Croatians 
almost from the time that they arrived in this country. . . . Radicalism was less 
developed among the Serbs, who seemed to be more dominated by priests and 
other traditional leaders.”22
The declining influence of the Catholic Church among Croatian immigrants 
may have also played a part in their radicalization. Immigration into a new 
land with few Croatian-speaking parishes caused a break with traditional 
institutions.23 While the first Croatian-language Catholic parish in the United 
19    Theodore Draper, American Communism and Soviet Russia (New York: Viking Press, 1960), 
pp. 190-92; and Harvey Klehr and John Earl Haynes, The American Communist Movement: 
Storming Heaven Itself (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1992), p.54.
20    “Fractions” consisted of Party members in non-Communist organizations formed to maxi-
mize Communist influence “for whatever ends the [P]arty decrees, on the organization of which 
they are members.” Nathan Glazer, The Social Background of American Communism (New York: 
Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1961), p. 50.
21   Čizmić, Hrvati u životu, p. 241. The Communists viewed Yugoslav Workers’ Clubs as “mass 
organizations,” intended “to draw foreign born workers into the general stream of the . . . labour 
[and Communist] movement.” William Rodney, Soldiers of the International: A History of the 
Communist Party of Canada, 1919-1929 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968), p. 159.
22   Steve Nelson, James R. Barett & Rob Ruck, Steve Nelson: American Radical (Pittsburgh: Uni-
versity of Pittsburgh Press, 1981), p. 283. Some observers claimed that peasant traditions rooted 
in the communal lifestyle known as the zadruga may have played a role in attracting Croatian 
immigrants to leftist movements, but the evidence for this is weak.
23   Edward Zivich, From Zadruga to Oil Refinery: Croatian Immigrants and Croatian Americans 
in Whiting, Indiana, 1890-1950 (New York: Garland Publishing, 1990), pp. 74-77.
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States dated from 1894, these parishes could not cover the spiritual needs of all 
immigrant colonies. Thus, though the Church continued to play a role in the 
Croatian-American community, it did not have a pervasive presence.24
Ultimately, the decision of Croatian-Americans to join the SPA and later 
the CPUSA became a personal one, often motivated by individual contacts. 
Stjepan Lojen entered the movement as a result of reading Radnička straža.25 
Another immigrant recalled that he joined the movement as a result of 
learning to read using Radnička straža.26 Stjepan Mesaroš, better known by his 
Americanized name, Steve Nelson, became a leftist through discussions with a 
Serbian-American co-worker.27
Beginning in the 1930s, a new, American-born generation came into the 
Party at least some of whom appear to have been influenced by their parents. 
The Gerlach and Fijan families offer an example. Anton Gerlach, born in 
Croatia of German descent, arrived in the United States in the early 1920s. 
He became an organizer in the Communist-controlled Auto Workers Union 
(AWU) and one of the leaders of the January 1933 Briggs strike.28 After his 
work with the AWU, he served as an official with the International Workers 
Order (IWO), a Communist-controlled fraternal organization based in New 
York. His stepsons, John and Fred (born Runjević), came to the United States 
as young children from a village near Sisak. Through the influence of their step-
father and their mother, both John and Fred joined the Party. The Party sent 
John to Moscow in late 1934, where he studied at the Communist University 
for National Minorities from the West (KUNMZ), in the hope that his training 
would be useful in work among the Croatian-American community. John 
ultimately served as volunteer for the International Brigades in Spain.29 His 
younger brother Fred became Carol Fijan’s first husband.
24   Croats counted only 33 Croatian-language Catholic parishes in the United States in 1937, 
compared with 46 Slovenian-language Catholic parishes and 38 Serbian Orthodox Church 
parishes. Mladineo, Narodni adresar, p. 895. In comparison, in 1918, 580 Italian churches and 
chapels served the needs of approximately 3,000,000 Italian immigrants, approximately one for 
every 5,000. Silvano M. Tomasi, Piety and Power: The Role of the Italian Parishes in the New York 
Metropolitan Area, 1880-1930 (New York: Center for Migration Studies, 1975), p. 99. If we ac-
cept 500,000 as the total number of Croats in North America during the 1930s, a similar propor-
tion would have required about 100 ethnic Croatian Catholic churches.
25   Stjepan Lojen, Uspomene jednog iseljenika (Znanje: Zagreb, 1963), p. 64.
26   P. B., “Petar Brčić,” Narodni glasnik (Chicago), 1 March 1961, p. 3.
27   Nelson, American Radical, p. 17. Nelson also notes that while he initially joined the SLP, he 
later switched to the CPUSA as the “SLPers I knew were nearly all Serbian, while all of the Croa-
tian Radicals seemed to have gone with the Communists.” Ibid., p. 19.
28   Roger Keeran, The Communist Party and the Auto Workers Union (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1980), p. 87.
29   Očak, Jugoslavenski emigranti, p. 197 (quoting from a letter from Gerlach to Očak); Đuro 
Gajdek, Španjolski borci Siska i Banije (Sisak: Muzej Sisak, 1985), pp. 86-87 and p. 261; and tel-
ephonic discussion by author with John Gerlach, 18 March 1998. John Gerlach passed away in 
California on 12 August 2008.
J. KRALJIC, The Croatian section of the communist party of the united states...
144
Carol Fijan’s father, Filip, had been born in the Hrvatsko zagorje region, 
north of Zagreb. Filip and his ethnic German wife initially lived in Milwaukee, 
a stronghold of German-speaking socialists prior to World War I, where he 
joined the SPA. He later moved to New York, became a member of the CPUSA 
and worked as a furrier, assisting in the building the Communist-dominated 
Furriers’ Union. Filip’s work among the Croatian-American community in 
New York focused on theatre productions in local Yugoslav and Croatian 
Workers’ Clubs, a tradition followed by Carol.30
Croatian-American Communists sought to spread their influence among 
the “masses” through a variety of means. The press remained a key component 
of their work in an age when newspapers represented the dominant media. 
In addition to their newspaper, Croatian-American Communists published 
numerous books and pamphlets as well as an annual almanac under the 
Radnička knjižara label in Chicago. 
The Communist-controlled Yugoslav Workers’ Clubs and Halls also proved 
an important forum to influence the community at large. The Clubs sponsored 
an array of activities, such as dances, picnics, plays, movies and lectures, which 
afforded workers an opportunity to enjoy inexpensive entertainment and the 
Party an opportunity to spread their message and recruit new members.
During the 1930s, the IWO became another potential means to obtain 
Party members and supporters. Established in 1930 as a multi-ethnic, fraternal 
benefits organization,31 the IWO had been divided into national groups, with a 
Croatian-Serbian one appearing in February 1935 with 800 members.32 Anton 
Gerlach headed the Croatian-Serbian group after taking over the task from its 
initial secretary, George Radatović, a West Virginia miner.33 Gerlach, a thin, 
bespeckled, somewhat balding man, oversaw the orderly split of the group 
into separate Croatian and Serbian branches in November 1937, when the 
IWO’s Croatian section became formally known as the Croatian Benevolent 
Fraternity (Hrvatsko potporno bratstvo or HPB).34 Though the HPB lost a small 
number of members to the Serbian section as a result of the division, the HPB 
under Gerlach’s leadership saw steady growth. By the time of the IWO’s fifth 
national convention in April 1940, the HPB numbered 5,981 adult members 
(a thirty-five percent increase over the number of the combined Croatian-
30   Nenad Gol, “Slovo za Filipa, Juliju i Carol Fijan,” Matica, January, 1984, pp. 12-13; and inter-
view by author with Carol Fijan, 28 March 1999.
31   On the IWO, see Thomas J. Walker, Pluralistic Fraternity: The History of the International 
Worker”s Order (New York: Garland Publishing, 1991).
32   Nacionalni odbor sekcije, “Od četvrte do pete konvencije,” Fraternal Outlook (New York), vol. 
I, no. 1, June - July 1940, Hrvatske sekcije, p. 51.
33   Ibid.
34   “I.W.O Adds Serbian Section to its Family of Nations,” New Order (New York), vol. VI, no. 1, 
November, 1937, p. 6.
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Serbian Section at its fourth convention) and 2,341 youth members in eighty-
two lodges throughout the United States.35
In addition to the IWO figures, some other available figures give an 
indication of Communist support in the Croatian-American community at the 
time. In 1933, thirty-eight Yugoslav Workers’ Clubs claimed 1,718 members 
and in 1934 sixty Clubs claimed approximately 3,000 members.36 In the late 
1930s, an estimated 1,800 to 2,000 Croatian-Americans belonged to the 
CPUSA.37 These represented small amounts compared with the approximately 
half million Croatian-Americans in the United States in the 1930s. However, 
the political fanaticism and organizational skills of the Communists made 
their voices appear loader than their numbers would otherwise justify.
organizational Changes and Disputes 
One of the dominant controversies underlying the work of Croatian-
American Communists in the second half of the 1930s became the 
transformation of the CPUSA’s Yugoslav Section into separate Serbian, 
Croatian and Slovenian Sections.
The reasons underlying the decision to reorganize the Yugoslav Section 
remains unclear in light of conflicting testimony. Stjepan Lojen, one of the 
leaders of the Section,38 claims in his memoirs that the decision had been 
reached in 1934 after the arrival to the United States of Nikola Kovačević, a 
Montenegrin Serb, who appeared unannounced at the Second Conference of 
the Yugoslav Workers’ Clubs in Pittsburgh on April 14, 1934.39 Lojen claims 
that Kovačević questioned the existence of a Yugoslav Section when no supra-
national Yugoslav groups of any significance existed among the immigrant 
35   “Od četvrte do pete konvencije,” p. 51. The HPB also represented an import source of funding 
for Radnik. See Report on the American Slav Congress and Related Organizations, 81st Cong., 2nd 
Sess., H. Rep. No. 1951, 26 June 1949, p. 83.
36   “Prva konferencija J.R. kluba u USA,” Borba (Toronto) 1 March 1933, p. 5; and Čizmić, Hrvati 
u životu, p. 241
37   An estimated 500 of these Party members lived in western Pennsylvania, 200 in California 
and on the West Coast, and 100 in New York. Croatians in America, Earl Browder Papers, Series 
II, Subject Files, microfilm reel 4, no. 65, R-2467, Tamiment Institute, New York University, New 
York. Another report cited to by Glazer shows 300 Croat members in May 1938 which Glazer 
accurately describes as appearing “small.” Glazer, The Social Basis, p. 222 n.9.
38   Lojen (1894-1967), born in Kraljevac, Croatia, arrived in the United States prior to World 
War I. “Stjepan Lojen,” Narodni glasnik (Chicago), 28 June 1967, p. 1.
39   On Kovačević see Đuro Đurašković, Nikola Kovačević (Beograd: Izdavačko poduzeće Rad, 
1965). Kovačević had been sent to the U.S. to work among Yugoslav immigrants “to collect vol-
untary contributions for the [Communist Party of Yugoslavia] and to politically work along the 
line of our Party.” Očak, Jugoslavenski emigranti, p. 210 (quoting from materials in the Archives 
of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia).
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communities. Each of the Serbs, Slovenes and Croats had their own independent 
organizations, a situation which Kovačević believed the Communists should 
imitate. Kovačević supposedly found the adherence by Yugoslav-American 
Communists to supra-national Yugoslavism to be contrary to the Party’s line 
on the national question.40
Lojen’s testimony seems, however, questionable as the reorganization of the 
Yugoslav Section did not occur until 1936, almost two years later.41 Indicatively, 
Lojen and many other works concerning this period which appeared in 
Communist Yugoslavia fail to mention the work undertaken on this issue by 
Mirko Marković, one of the most important Yugoslav-American Communists 
during this period (the virtual erasure of Marković from these texts no doubt 
stemmed from his subsequent support for Stalin during the Stalin-Tito dispute 
for which Marković later spent time in the notorious Goli otok prison).
Born in 1907, Marković, a Montenegrin like Kovačević, had strong ties to 
Moscow. His paternal uncle, Vukasin Marković, a colleague of Lenin’s, came to 
the Soviet Union with Mirko in the 1920s. While there, Mirko completed his 
studies at KUNMZ in 1929 and obtained a doctorate in economics at the Red 
Prefecture in Moscow in the mid-1930s.42
Marković states that he received an offer to be sent abroad by the Comintern 
while in Moscow during its VIIth Congress. He obtained a mandate to reorganize 
the “troubled Yugoslav movement [then based] in Chicago” and to work on the 
implementation of the resolutions of the recent Congress.43 Arriving in the 
latter half of 1935, the Central Committee of the CPUSA (CC CPUSA) gave 
Marković a month to complete a report and make recommendations. Marković 
went to Chicago and found that Kovačević had done nothing since he felt that 
he had neither the authority nor strength to carry out a reorganization and 
40   Lojen, Uspomene, p. 160. Possibly under Kovačević’s influence, the then on-going Yugoslav 
Workers” Club Conference renamed the organization as the Alliance of Clubs of Croat and Serb 
Workers. Čizmić, Hrvati u životu, p. 241.
41   Moreover, some as yet unclarified troubles within the Yugoslav Section, apparently unrelated 
to the nationality question, required outside intervention.. Fred Brown (pseudonym of Mario 
Alpi), head of the CPUSA’s national groups, wrote that many Yugoslav fractions had become in-
active or showed open opportunism and sectarianism “as in the case of Farrell, [Pennsylvania], 
where the Party members have practically divorced themselves from the Yugoslav worker who 
constitute a large portion of the steel workers in Farrell . . . .” F. Brown, “Improve Fraction Work 
in Mass Organization,” Party Organizer, January 1934, vol. VII, no. 1, p. 26.
42   Marković returned to Yugoslavia in 1945, serving as dean of the Economics Faculty of Bel-
grade University before his political disgrace and imprisonment following the outbreak of the 
Cominform dispute. See Jugoslovenski napredni pokret u SAD i Kanadi - Progressive Movement 
of Yugoslavs in the USA and Canada (Toronto: Nordam Jugoslav Publishers, 1983), pp. 13-14; 
and Ivo Banac, With Stalin Against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1988), p. 115-16, n. 173.
43   Mirko Marković, “O razvoju naprednog pokreta kod Amerikanaca i Kanađana jugosloven-
skog porijekla,” in Jugoslovenski napredni, p. 28.
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because, as Kovačević allegedly explained to Marković, he had been “sucked 
into the familiarity of the then-current leadership.”44 Marković recommended 
three, far-reaching proposals: (1) the dismissal of the current leadership since 
it had become disconnected from other, non-Communist mass organizations 
with which it should work politically, (2) the reorganization of the Section into 
three separate Serb, Croat and Slovene national sections, and (3) the removal 
of the headquarters of the Section’s leadership from Chicago to Pittsburgh, 
the most important center of Yugoslav immigrant organizations in the U.S.45 
Marković claims that he read his recommendations to the South Slavic 
leaders in Chicago prior to sending them to the CC CPUSA in New York. 
“The atmosphere at that meeting was difficult and hard, but this could not be 
avoided.”46
According to Marković, the CC CPUSA accepted his proposals in their 
entirety and instructed that conferences for each national group be held where 
new leaderships for each would be chosen. The Croatian Section held its first 
conference in May 1936 where Leo Fisher, Frank Borich, Lojen (recently 
returned from a stint at the KUNMZ), Tony Minerich, and Stjepan Pleše (also 
known as Miroković) became the Section’s leaders, with Kovačević added on 
temporarily.47 A Yugoslav Coordination Bureau containing three representatives 
of each national group and with Marković as its secretary, coordinated the 
activities of the three new Sections.48 In addition, each national group obtained 
44   Ibid., p. 29. However, Kovačević in a letter to the Comintern in 1934, wrote that he would 
not effectuate quick radical reforms. Among other problems, he noted the absence of a qualified 
editor for the new proposed Slovenian paper. Očak, Jugoslavenski emigranti, pp. 210-11 (quoting 
from a letter in the Comintern Archives).
45   Marković, “O razvoju,” p. 29.
46   Ibid., p. 30.
47  Ibid. Fisher (1897-1977), a Croatian Jew born in Kapan, Virovitica, Croatia, arrived in the 
United States in 1912. He was associated with and edited, with some breaks, the Croatian-
language CPUSA newspaper until its demise in 1973. He served as Secretary for the CPUSA 
for Minnesota in 1930. Ivan Čizmić, “Leo Fisher,” in Enciklopedija Jugoslavije (Zagreb: Jugo-
slavenski leksikografski zavod Miroslav Krleža, 1986), vol. 4, p. 180. Borich had formerly led 
the Communist-controlled National Mine Workers” Union (NMWU). He died in New York 
in 1965. Čizmić, Hrvati u životu, p. 222; and “Franjo Borić,” Narodni glasnik (Chicago), 7 July 
1965, p. 3. Concerning Minerich (or Majnerich) (1905-1964), see “Vječna mu slava,” Narodni 
glasnik (Chicago), 17 February 1965, p. 1, and Prica, Amerika, p. 28. Concerning Pleše (1888-
1977), born near Brod na Kupi in Croatia, see Tom Čuča, “Stevo Pleše (Miroković),” Naše novine 
(Toronto), 1 June 1977, p. 4. In his memoirs, Lojen often uses pseudonyms in describing some 
of the leaders of the Section in a laughable attempt to hide their identity from U.S. government 
persecution. Fisher, for example, is referred to in his work as Lujo Ribić (meaning “small fisher-
man”). Lojen, Uspomene, p. 106.
48   Marković, “O razvoju,” p. 30. In his memoirs, Marković emphasizes that “every other descrip-
tion of the reorganization of the Yugoslav movement [in the CPUSA] does not reflect the truth, 
is tendentious, invented and a lie. I emphasize this because such attempts, unfortunately oc-
curred more than once in the past. Ibid. Marković also levels other criticisms at Lojen’s memoirs. 
Ibid. at p. 50.
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its own newspaper, the Croatian Communists inheriting Radnik (which soon 
thereafter changed its name to Glas Radnika and, later, Radnički glasnik), while 
the Serbs established Slobodna reč and the Slovenes Naprej.49
These changes did not go smoothly. At least two members of the Yugoslav 
Section, Šime Horzić and his wife Zlata, found themselves removed from the 
Bureau.50 According to Lojen, opposition to the changes especially became 
noticeable among Croats in California. “For many years they worked as 
Yugoslavs together with some Herzegovinian and Dalmatian Serbs, and now, 
when the reorganization occurred, they did not see the need for it nor were 
they able to reorient themselves.”51
Section leaders sought to convince their comrades of the need for these 
changes. Thus, Leo Fisher, wrote in an article appearing at the time in Radnički 
glasnik that a “significant amount of misunderstanding” had arisen as a result 
of the reorganization. Fisher argued that Communists had to recognize that no 
Yugoslav nationality existed and that, while the conditions for its creation may 
be evident, the transformation of Croats, Serbs and Slovenes into Yugoslavs 
would take generations. More importantly, “Yugoslavism,” according to 
Fisher, acted as a dam to the growth of Communism as the “bourgeoisie” 
had successfully argued that the Communist movement was an anti-national 
one.52
Significantly, the reorganization of the Yugoslav Section, whether done 
under the auspices of Marković or Kovačević, had been orchestrated by 
49   While Lojen became the secretary of the Croatian Bureau, one observer claims that Borich 
became the most dominant leader of the Section at this time. “By nature clearheaded, energetic, 
aggressive and eloquent, he knew how to impose himself on other people. He had no [respect] 
and placed no scruples [in the way of his] road to fulfilling his immeasurable ambitions. [He 
never tired] in creating various combinations in the battle for influence. He had something of a 
[leadership complex] in his character, identifying himself [with] the Party, his authority with the 
authority of the Party.” Prica, Amerika, p. 28. Prica described Lojen as typical of those who had 
been schooled in the Soviet Union and who returned from there as functionaries. “He struggled 
to be the type of Communist offered up as a model in the Party schools and courses in Moscow. 
He consciously presented and defended the Party’s positions, often dramatically and patheti-
cally, not adding to any original ideas or even formulations.” Ibid.
50   Born in Ruča, Croatia, Šime Horzić (1898-1937) became well-known in the community after 
participating in a six-man “international amnesty delegation” sent to Yugoslavia in July 1935 
under the auspices of a supposedly ad hoc “International Committee for Amnesty in Yugosla-
via,” a group actually sponsored by the Communists. He subsequently died as a volunteer for 
Spanish Republican forces. S. Horzich, “Što je vidjela medjunarodna istražna komisija u Jugo-
slaviji?” Radnički kalendar (Chicago), 1936, pp. 89-93; and “Kratki opis burnog života druga 
Šime Horzić,” Radnički glasnik (Chicago), 28 April 1937, sec. 2, p. 2. Zlata later left the Party and 
testified against Frank Borich in the ultimately unsuccessful deportation proceedings brought 
against him. “Tko su svjedoci protiv Franje Borića,” Jedinstvo (Toronto), 31 August 1950, p. 6.
51   Lojen, Uspomene, p. 161.
52   “Zašto zasebni pokret?,” Borba (Toronto), 28 May 1936, p. 2, and 30 May 1936, p. 2 (reprint 
from Radnički glasnik).
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Comintern functionaries sent to the United States, not as a result of demands 
made by Croatian-American Communists. The change in structure had been 
forced through as the existence of the Yugoslav Section in the CPUSA failed 
to reflect the views of the Comintern and the Communist Party of Yugoslavia 
(CPY) on the national question in Yugoslavia.
The CPY initially downplayed national differences among Yugoslavia’s 
ethnic groups after the CPY’s formation, later arguing that constitutional 
changes granting autonomy to the country’s various regions would solve these 
“bourgeois” concerns. But, after being subjected to criticism from Stalin, the 
CPY modified its position in the mid-1920s and advocated Yugoslavia’s break-
up into separate states. The CPY changed its stance on the national question 
again in 1934, arguing that, while the Party would support the right of each 
nationality to exercise its right of self-determination, it would no longer 
advocate Yugoslavia’s dissolution. In keeping with this policy, the CPY began 
to undertake the formation of separate but subordinate Communist Parties for 
Slovenia and Croatia (which would be formed several years later in 1937).
While it may appear odd that the Comintern would take a such a keen 
interest in the workings of a foreign language section of the CPUSA, in fact 
the Yugoslav Section represented an important moral and financial pillar of 
support for the CPY. The CPY itself had become a predominately emigrant 
political organization by the early 1930s and the number of members of the 
Yugoslav Section at times rivaled the number of members in the CPY.53 Thus, the 
Comintern needed to exercise control over Croatian-American Communists 
in order to assure continuity in policies which it forced the CPY to adopt.
Whatever the reasons for the establishment of a new Croatian Section, its 
formation proved to be fortuitous. While its founding had not been connected 
with the change in the Comintern’s “United” and “Popular Front” tactics, 
its newly discovered “nationalism” expressed the desires of many Croatian-
Americans which made the Communists’ propaganda concerning the “United 
Front” more agreeable to those wanting to believe it.54
53   Published figures concerning CPY membership at the time provide varying estimates. One 
source claims 2,000 members in 1932. Pero Morača, Dr. Dušan Bilandžić and Dr. Stanislav 
Stojanović, Istorija Saveza Komunista Jugoslavije (kratak pregled) (Beograd: Izdavačko poduzeće 
Rad, 1977, 2nd ed.), p. 60. Another source claims that CPY membership doubled to 1,300 mem-
bers during the period from mid-1932 to the end of that year. M. Sentić, S. Sigetlija and M. 
Potočki, Kronologija SKJ 1919-1969 (Zagreb: Stvarnost, 1970), p. 65.
54    While outside the scope of the current work, one should note that the establishment of sepa-
rate national sections among the Yugoslav Communists led to friction between the Croatian and 
Serbian Sections. Croatian-American Communist leaders apparently claimed that the Serbian 
Section”s “United Front” organization, the Vidovdan Congress, came under the sway of reac-
tionaries. Ultimately, they supposedly assisted Marković after the latter had returned from Spain 
in 1939 in re-imposing order over the Serbian Section. See generally Prica, Amerika. See also 
Marković, “O razvoju,” p. 41; and Josip Broz Tito, Sabrana djela (Belgrade & Zagreb: Izdavački 
centar Komunist BIGZ and Naprijed, 1983), vol. 3, p. 113 and vol. 4, p. 80 and p. 233.
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The attempted Implementation of the “United front” in the Croatian-
american Community 
Croatian-Americans could choose from a wide-variety of organizations 
having a range of political views, running the gamut from pro-Yugoslav 
to Communist. However, in addition to the Communists, three other 
organizations dominated the political discourse in the Croatian-American 
community during the 1930s: the Croatian Circle, the Domobrans and the 
Croatian Peasant Party (Hrvatska seljačka stranka) (HSS).
Established in 1928, the Croatian Circle (Hrvatsko kolo) espoused a liberal 
policy which strongly advocated Croatian independence. It started with high 
hopes and established branches throughout the United States and had as its 
main journalistic advocate Hrvatski list i Danica hrvatska, published in New 
York by Ivan Krešić.55
However, by the mid-1930s, internal tensions wracked the organization. 
The right wing within the Circle began to advocate a policy supportive of Ante 
Pavelić and his revolutionary organization, the Ustashe. The Circle’s leadership, 
however, by and large, viewed Pavelić with anathema, not only because of 
his openly fascist, anti-democratic views, but also because they regarded 
Pavelić’s greatest supporter, Mussolini, with great trepidation on account of 
his pretensions to the Croatian coast. The right wing broke off, established a 
rival organization, the Domobrani (the Home Guards) and their own weekly 
newspaper, Nezavisna Hrvatska Država, in Pittsburgh.56
While the HSS had a political organization in the United States (centered in 
Cleveland), its base of support in North America lied in Canada. Allegedly at the 
request of the HSS’s leaders, Petar Stanković moved to Canada and established 
a pro-Croatian Peasant Party newspaper, Kanadski glas (later renamed Hrvatski 
glas), in Winnipeg in March 1929. The newspaper provided the impetus to 
establish Peasant Party organizations among Croatian immigrant communities 
in Canada and the United States during the next several years. In cooperation 
with one of the Peasant Party’s leaders, August Košutić, then visiting Canada, 
an organizing convention for the Croatian Peasant Organization took place in 
Toronto in January 1932.57
55   Concerning the work of the Croatian Circle, see Joseph Kraja, “The Croatian Circle, 1928-
1946: Chronology and Reminiscences,” Journal of Croatian Studies, vol. 5-6, 1964-65, pp. 145-
204. Kraja, who served a prominent leader of the Croatian Circle, had previously been a member 
of the SLP.
56   James Sadkovich, Italian Support for Croatian Separatism 1927-1937 (New York: Garland 
Publishing, Inc., 1987), pp. 266-69. On the Domobrani see, Mario Jareb, Ustaško-domobranski 
pokret: od nastanku do travnja 1941. godine (Zagreb: Školska knjiga, 2006).
57   Petar Stanković, “Radi čega novine?,” in Stjepan Gaži, ed., Spomenica na dvadest godina 
Hrvatskih seljačkih organizacija u Kanadi (Winnipeg: Hrvatske seljačke organizacije u Kanadi, 
1952), pp. 79-80. Stanković had previously been in the United States where he had been involved 
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Don Ivan Gršković represented another prominent political force in the 
Croatian-American community during this period. Gršković published the 
New York-based Svijet, the only non-Communist Croatian language daily in 
the United States for a period during the 1930s. A former Catholic priest, he 
became the recognized leader of the Croatian community during World War 
I and a prominent advocate of the formation of Yugoslavia. For a time, he 
served as editor of the CFU’s newspaper. Following the War, Gršković became 
disillusioned with the Yugoslav regime (though not with the concept of South 
Slavic unity) and advocated what can best be described as a leftist, pro-Soviet 
policy, though one not tied to the Communist Party.58
The CFU almost acted as an umbrella organization within the Croatian 
community, encompassing partisans of all political views. Established in 
Pittsburgh in 1894, the CFU grew dramatically through expansion and mergers 
with other Croatian fraternal organizations.59 In an age without any government 
safety net, the CFU filled a pressing need by making available death benefits 
and health insurance at low cost, while, at the same time, through the activities 
of its lodges, providing a social outlet for its members.
The Communists could not ignore the CFU which became the largest 
and richest Croatian-American organization. They early on established an 
organized, fractional presence within the CFU. “Communists were able to work 
openly within the CFU lodges and were often respected as good members of 
the organization. We were seen not as guys who would just get up and talk, but 
as men who would recruit for the lodge, attend to the funerals, and help with 
the social functions. We didn’t skirt the dirty work necessary to keep the lodge 
going. After all, we were Croatians and needed the lodge as much as anybody 
else.”60
The Workers’ Party, the then legal arm of the Communist Party, directed its 
national group members to work and develop fractions in fraternal organizations 
at its 1925 convention. However, Croatian-American Communists already 
recognized the need to do this in 1924, with Radnik devoting significant space 
to agitating for work within the CFU (then known as the National Croatian 
Society (NCS)). Radnik recognized that the NCS, unlike the unions, was not 
a revolutionary organization. Nevertheless, Radnik argued that the NCS”s 
with some leftist political groups. Bogdan Radica, “O Petru Stankoviću i o njegovoj ulozi u 
iseljeničkom tisku,” Hrvatska revija, vol. 23, 1973, p. 425.
58   There is no critical biography of Niko Gršković. See Ivan Čizmić, “Prilog za životpis Nika 
Grškovića,” Krčki zbornik, vol. 1, 1970, pp. 371-83.
59    There are a number of general histories of the CFU: Croatian Fraternal Union, Kratki pregled 
povijesti Hrvatske bratske zajednice 1894-1949 (Pittsburgh: Croatian Fraternal Union, 1949); and 
Ivan Čizmić, Hrvatska bratska zajednica 1894-1994 (Zagreb: Golden Marketing, 1994). 
60   Nelson, American Radical, p. 45.
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predominately working class members necessarily had to participate in the 
class struggle, as a result of which both unions and fraternal groups need to 
work together to benefit the proletariat.61
The Communists faced stiff opposition in their efforts to exercise influence 
over the NCS and, later, the CFU. In 1921, the NCS elected as its President 
Tomo Benešić, one of the founders of Radnička straža.62 Benešić and his 
collaborators had came under the influence of the Educationalists or Prosvjetaši. 
The Educationalists had been formed by Đuro Kutuzović and Teodor Cvetkov. 
Cvetkov, an ethnic Bulgarian born in Serbia, had been the editor of Communist 
Party newspaper Znanje in the early 1920s. He and Kutuzović argued that “the 
workers” class could not take power until it had freed itself of religion and 
until it became familiar with the natural and social sciences.”63 Cvetkov and 
Kutuzović ultimately broke with the Party, establishing a new newspaper, Novi 
svijet, and, in 1924, a new organization, Jugoslavenski prosvjetni savez (Yugoslav 
Educational Association).64 Benešić and most of the remaining leadership in 
the NCS backed Cvetkov and Kutuzović.
The changing political viewpoints of the NCS’s leadership in the early 
1920s gave rise to two contrary political groupings in the organization. One 
group, which coalesced into the so-called “National Bloc,” argued that Benešić 
and his supporters were nothing better than stooges of the Communist Party.65 
Benešić’s subsequent support for the Educationalists drove the Communists to 
form their own “Workers’ Progressive Bloc” in 1926.66 These opposition groups 
led to Benešić’s humiliating defeat in his run to become CFU President at its 
first convention in 1926. The “National Bloc,” led by Ivan D. Butković (1890-
1980), ultimately succeeded in wresting control of the CFU when Butković 
became its President in 1932.67 
Other than Butković, the most prominent leader of the CFU during his 
tenure was Milan Petrak, the Croatian-language editor of the CFU”s weekly 
61   Čizmić, Hrvatska bratska, pp. 129-30. See also S. M. Loyen, “Potporne organizacije i radnički 
pokret,” Crveni kalendar (Chicago), 1925, pp. 68-69.
62    Čizmić, Hrvatska bratska, p. 181.
63    Lojen, Uspomene, p. 111.
64   Ibid., pp. 112-15 and Čizmić, Hrvati u životu, p. 201 and 211-18. Concerning Cvetkov, see 
“Teodor Cvetkov,” Narodni glasnik (Chicago), 28 April 1965, p. 5. Kutuzović soon left Novi svijet 
while the paper, later known as Znanje, continued to appear until 1939. Cvetkov later became 
the head of the CFU’s orphanage. “Raketirstvo i licemjerstvo ‘hrvatskih’ komunista u Americi,” 
in Nezavisna Država Hrvatska (Pittsburgh), 4 May 1940, p. 3.
65   Čizmić, Hrvatska bratska, p. 184-86. A splinter group led by Catholic priests denounced the 
radicalism of the NCS’s leaders and formed the Croatian Catholic Union (CCU). The CCU grew 
to less than 9,000 members on the eve of World War II, paling in comparison to the CFU”s then 
100,000 members. The CCU only merged back into the CFU in 2006.
66   Lojen, Uspomene, p. 129.
67   Concerning Butković, see Tihomir Telišman, “Butković, Ivan,” in Hrvatski biografski leksikon 
(Zagreb: Leksikografski zavod “Miroslav Krleža, 1989), vol. 2, pp. 533-34.
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newspaper, the Zajedničar. Together, Butković and Petrak led the CFU through 
the tumultuous 1930s. In addition to facing steep declines in membership in the 
organization due to the Depression, the CFU had to contend with generational 
changes which caused the CFU to establish English-speaking lodges and to 
introduce an English-language page in its newspaper.68
During the early half of the 1930s, the Communists in the CFU, who at 
this point described themselves as the “Left Wing within the CFU,” scathingly 
attacked the “National Bloc’s” leadership despite the latter’s strong support of 
the union movement and the New Deal.69 
The anti-Communists had a number of trump cards which they used to 
discredit the Communists. Among other things, they noted that Communist 
promotion of the IWO came at the expense of the CFU.70 The Communists 
justified the establishment of the IWO by arguing that other fraternal groups 
had been supposedly bourgeois based, which prevented “workers in the 
fraternal movement [from] an understanding of the economic and political 
causes of their economic insecurity . . . .”71 Moreover, the Communists argued 
that the IWO more accurately reflected American values, ones which, while 
respecting multi-ethnicity also encouraged inter-ethnic relations, something 
which an ethnically-based CFU could not offer its membership.72 However, 
68   Peter Rachleff, “Class, Ethnicity and the New Deal: The Croatian Fraternal Union in the 
1930s,” in Peter Kivisto, The Ethnic Enigma: The Salience of Ethnicity for European Origin Groups 
(Philadelphia: The Balch Institute Press, 1989), p. 93.
69   Partly, this criticism stemmed from Butković’s and Petrak’s flirtation with the Domobrans. 
The Communists attacked the CFU leadership on other grounds as well, arguing for a drastic 
reduction of insurance rates for unemployed members. However, in December 1930, the CFU’s 
Supreme Board allowed unemployed members to draw down on their insurance policies in or-
der to keep up payments on their dues. “By late in the winter of 1933, an estimated twenty-thou-
sand men and women - nearly one-third of the adult membership - were doing so. Clearly, this 
was no solution, since it salvaged the individual’s membership by imperiling the organization’s 
overall solvency. . . . Over the course of the early 1930s, the CFU’s national leadership reached 
the limits of its ability to help members survive the hard times. No amount of manipulation 
of dues and expenditures, or special fund raising efforts, could produce the required money.” 
Rachleff, “Class Ethnicity,” p. 93.
70   “International Workers Order,” Svijet (New York), 4 October 1934, p. 2.
71   “Build the I.W.O. Into a Mass Organization,” Daily Worker (New York), 27 January 1934, p. 8. 
See also Zapisnik pete konvencije Hrvatske Bratske Zajednice u Sjedinjenim državama Amerike, 
CFU: Pittsburgh, 1939, p. 197 (statement of Petrak).
72   “Our enemies attempt [to convince] workers that individual language sections loose their 
national uniqueness since they are united within one fraternal union with other peoples. . . . 
[However, we] cannot walk with our feet on American soil, and live with our heads in the old 
homeland. . . . Unity and the fraternal work of our various national units proves that we can 
remain American Croats, Serbs, etc., while becoming good Americans at the same time. Nation-
ality, religion or political beliefs do not bother us in the factories, in the mines or in the unions. 
Why should they then bother us in the fraternal benevolent movement?” “Od četvrte do pete 
konvencije,” p. 51.
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by being active in the CFU while promoting the IWO, the Communists put 
themselves in a position where they clearly had conflicts of interests.
The Left Wing, on the other hand, used the negative effects of the Great 
Depression on the financial health of the CFU to criticize its leadership.73 
Beginning in April 1933, Radnik called for a national conference to discuss 
solvency issues.74
These attacks ultimately caused Butković to respond at a Supreme Board 
meeting in March 1934 where he bitterly attacked the Communists for trying 
to take over the CFU and claiming that their questions concerning the CFU”s 
fiscal solvency caused many members to leave the organization. He also argued 
that many Communist-controlled lodges ignored lodge business, focusing 
instead on passing resolutions critical of the Board.75 In April 1934, the Board 
passed a resolution calling the Left Wing illegal and warning its leaders that 
they faced expulsion.76 In response, the Left Wing went on a counteroffensive, 
culminating in a challenge to appear for a debate on 29 July 1934 in Pittsburgh 
before 2,500 spectators organized by the Left Wing’s leaders, Stjepan Lojen, 
Petar Muselin and Nikola Bušić.
Lojen delivered a long speech at the meeting, arguing that Butković and 
the CFU leadership advocated bourgeois policies and supported the Yugoslav 
“fascist” regime.77 He specifically attacked them for their support of the “New 
Deal” and the National Recovery Administration (NRA) which he claimed 
supported large capitalists “against the position of the working class.”78 
Lojen noted that the CFU leadership attacked the Left Wing for propagating 
Communism. But, Lojen retorted, “Communism is the only hope of working 
humanity! Not only that, but Communism is the only escape that the working 
people of the world have from today’s capitalist chaos and the only future 
which would benefit mankind.”79 Chillingly, Lojen noted that some of the 
CFU”s own leaders had formerly been members of the Party. “Today they foam 
at their mouths shouting against the danger of Communism. Yes, for them 
Communism is truly a danger because they know that the time will come when 
73   Lojen, Uspomene, p. 163.
74   Čizmić, Hrvatska bratska, p. 241-41.
75   Ibid.
76   Lojen, Uspomene, p. 164.
77    S. M. Loyen, Tko gradi i tko razara HBZ?, NP: Lijevo krilo H.B. Zajednica, 1934, p. 12.
78    Ibid., p. 22. The NRA had been created as part of the National Industrial Recovery Act which, 
among other things, promoted industrial cooperation to regulate prices and production while, 
at the same time, provided for the right to collective bargaining. Lojen’s attack on the NRA 
reflected the CPUSA’s then “pessimistic and shrill . . . view of the NRA.” Klehr, The Heyday, p. 
123.
79   Loyen, Tko gradi., p. 35.
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they will be unable to sleep in the farthest deserts from fear of the unstoppable 
workers’ courts.”80
The Board sent no representatives to the meeting, but took administrative 
action instead. In early October 1934, the Board ordered the commencement 
of an internal jury proceeding against Lojen, Muselin and Bušić for taking 
actions contrary to the interests of the CFU.81
The Left Wing issued a response in late October which claimed that not 
only did the Board seek to “introduce a fascist dictatorship over the members 
of the [CFU],” but that it also wanted to introduce priests into the CFU’s 
orphanage in Des Plaines, Illinois.82 At the same time, Leo Fisher sued Petrak 
and the CFU for defamation for an article which appeared in the Zajedničar 
which apparently charged that Fisher had engaged in white slavery.83
In early 1935, the Left Wing formally adopted a program in preparation for 
the CFU”s Fourth Convention later that year. Claiming that the Communists 
did not seek to turn the CFU into a Communist organization but only into 
one which served the interests of its working class members, the Left Wing 
proposed the continuation of the struggle against Pavelić and the unitarist 
Yugoslav fascists and the removal of a portion of the then current leadership 
of the CFU. Unlike the new “United Front” tactic which the Comintern would 
proclaim later that year, the Left Wing advocated the implementation of the 
old “United Front” policy of the “Third Period” which rejected coalitions with 
the leaders of other organizations and sought to take over such organizations 
“from below” through Communist “fractions” by “boring from within.”84 
In preparation for the CFU’s 1935 Convention, certain Left Wing delegates 
attended regional meetings,85 while the leadership established their own news 
sheet, the Borbeni Zajedničar, to advocate their program.
The Left Wing’s official program, issued by its secretary Nikola Bušić on 
1 June 1935, continued to be confrontational, demanding the removal of all 
Board members “guilty for the current state” of the organization. The platform 
also called for, among other things: (i) a resolution condemning the Greater 
80   Ibid., p. 45.
81   “Priprava za konvenciju H.B. Zajednice,” Svijet (New York), 10 October 1934, p. 2.
82  Glavni odbor lijevog krila u HBZ, “Na obranu pravila H.B. Zajednice,” Svijet (New York), 
30 October 1934, p. 2. The Supreme Board soon thereafter withdrew its proposal concerning 
the placement of priests in the orphanage. “Mjesto dvije poslanice, kratka poruka,” Svijet (New 
York), 4 November 1934. 
83   Fisher subsequently dropped his lawsuit after the Zajedničar published a retraction. “Jedan 
dopis koji ne spada u službeno glasilo,” Svijet (New York), 9 June 1936, p. 2.
84   “Zajednica pred konvenciju,” Svijet (New York), 4 April 1935, p. 2 (quoting from Radnik, 29 
March 1935).
85   E.g., those of Northern California met in Mountain View on April 28, 1935. “Dobri zaključi i 
preporuka,” Svijet (New York), 4 June 1935, p. 2.
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Serbian regime in Yugoslavia and the Ustashe; (ii) greater democratization in 
the CFU by revising the CFU’s bylaws to allow members at lodge meetings to 
discuss all issues which they believe affect their lives and the CFU as a whole, to 
allow members to vote by referendum without any restrictions by the Supreme 
Board, to prohibit the expulsion of members on the basis of religious or 
political beliefs, and to open the pages of the Zajedničar to pieces reflecting the 
interests of the members and the struggle of the working people; (iii) support 
for measures against the deportation of immigrants; and (iv) adoption of cost 
saving measures by the CFU.86
At the opening of the Convention, the Communists received a prompt blow 
as delegates approved a motion supported by Butković which expelled Fisher 
from the Convention hall as a result of his then pending law suit.87 During 
the Convention, however, the Left Wing made moves to enter into a coalition 
with a newly coalesced group known as the “Independent Delegates.” They 
agreed to work together to modify the membership of the Supreme Board and 
to support a resolution calling for the freedom of Croatia from Belgrade and 
condemning interference in the region by Mussolini and Hitler. They further 
agreed to seek allies among delegates supporting the Croatian Circle, the HSS, 
the Educationalists and even individual Domobrans.88 The Left Wing also 
sought to modify its image, adopting a new name, the Napredni Zajedničari 
- the Progressive Fraternalists.89 In a post-mortem issued a month after the 
close of the Convention, the Progressives found that their coalition with the 
Independent Delegates brought noticeable results, despite the left’s minority 
position at the Convention. While the Convention re-elected Butković, the 
left’s candidate, Vinko Vuk, lost by only twelve votes. Vuk himself succeeded 
in winning the treasury post and the Progressives also obtained a number of 
other high offices in the organization.90  The Convention also saw the successful 
adoption of a resolution which not only condemned the policies of Pavelić 
and Mussolini but also opposed “any type of fascism in the ranks of the CFU, 
to change it into an agent of terrorist attacks against the . . . membership of 
the [CFU] and against other workers.”91 The Progressives called on leftists to 
continue to work in their lodges and increase membership in preparation for 
the next Convention, scheduled for 1939.
86   “Za očuvanje i napredak H.B. Zajednice,” Svijet (New York), 5 June 1935, p. 2 (reprinted from 
Radnik, June 1, 1935).
87   Ivan Senica, “Početak rada konvecije pokazuje promjene,” Svijet (New York), 14 June 1935, p. 1.
88   Ivan Senica, “Za suradnju naprednih članova H.B.Z. i osuda nasilja,” Svijet (New York), 20 
June 1935, p. 1.
89   “Napredni zajedničari,” Svijet (New York), 23 July 1935, p. 2.
90   Ibid.
91  Kratki pregled, p. 60-61. Apparently, the leadership of the Convention tried to overturn the 
resolution, but to no avail. Ibid., at pp. 61-62.
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The transformation of the Left Wing into Progressives and their coalition 
work with the Independents presaged the implementation of the Communists” 
new “United Front” tactic in the Croatian-American community.
The Croatian Section of the CPUSA formally set forth its new strategy at 
the Section’s First Conference in May 1936. In the proclamation issued by the 
Conference,92 the Section first recognized the past struggles of Croatians for 
national independence. “We Croatian Communists with complete justification 
see ourselves as the successors of all those glorious and heroic struggles of the 
Croatian people and are proud that history has allowed us to be the inheritors 
of these struggles in our own times . . . .” The Section claimed that the past 
showed that to be victorious in this battle, Croatians had to be united. This 
especially had to be the stance in the present. “Although there are varied 
political viewpoints and organizations with different policies among us, there 
are issues with which we can unite for a joint struggle in the defense of our 
interests.”
The proclamation listed these issues as equal rights and protection of the 
foreign-born, better pay and social security, the fight against fascism and war, 
and support for a Farmer-Labor Party93 and for the struggle of the Croatian 
people for freedom. The proclamation said that an initial step toward the 
latter goal was the release of all “national and workers’ prisoners” from jails in 
Royalist Yugoslavia.94 “At the same time, we must give moral, material and all 
other assistance to the Croatian people so that they can . . . exercise their rights 
as they determine, so that they are masters of their own house [and] can rule 
themselves.”
The proclamation called upon the CFU, the CCU, the Croatian Circle, 
Workers’ Clubs, the HSS and independent Croatian educational, cultural and 
other groups to “participate in the creation of a popular Croatian Front.” The 
Conference specifically directed that conferences and meetings be held in 
various localities where issues could be discussed and agreements forged. “From 
these meetings and discussions, a movement to call an All-Croatian Popular 
Congress needs to develop, which Congress will consist of representatives of 
all Croatian organizations which represent our entire emigrant people.”
92   The text of the proclamation is found in “Za jedinstvo hrvatskog naroda,” Radnički kalendar 
(Chicago), 1937, pp. 97-103. All quotations from the proclamation set forth in this article are 
from the same source.
93   The CPUSA promoted the creation of a Farmer-Labor Party during this period as “the Amer-
ican version of the Popular Front . . . .” Ottanelli, The Communist Party, p. 101.
94   The “national” prisoners actually represented Ustashe supporters. See “Lepoglava,” Radnički 
calendar (Chicago), 1937, pp. 82-96, which features photos of CPY leader Moše Pijade and Stje-
pan Javor, a prominent member in the 1920s of the Party of (State) Rights, from which the 
Ustashe obtained many of their leaders and supporters.
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At first glance, Croatian Communists appear to have had a number of 
potential allies with which a “United Front” could be formed in the community.95 
As noted above, other than the CCU and the Ustashe supporters among the 
Domobrans, all major Croatian organizations in the United States and Canada 
can be characterized as having had a left of center political viewpoint, with 
many supportive of the “New Deal” (even members of the CCU and the 
Domobrans supported “New Deal”).
But, Croatian-American Communists remained subject to Party discipline 
which could not stomach any potential rivals on the left. Thus, the older 
Educationalist leaders of the CFU remained to the Communists “traitors to 
the workers’ movement, who carry out within the CFU divisive policies of the 
same nature as the Trotskyites and Lovestonites carry out in worker unions.”96
More importantly, many Croatian-American leaders and organizations 
greeted the pronouncement of the “United Front” by their Communist co-
nationals with skepticism, perhaps primarily because the Communists’ prior 
dealings with these persons and groups had poisoned the atmosphere in their 
relations. For example, only a few months before, Nikola Bušić had written that 
Gršković had never been a friend of the CFU’s “Left Wing.”97 The Communists 
previously described the Croatian Circle as a “fascist” organization,98 and 
labeled the Peasant Party’s leaders as “kulaks” and “bourgeois.”99 Now, the 
Croatian Communists eagerly sought to bring together not only Gršković but 
other groups and individuals with whom they had been at loggerheads.
Gršković refused to enter into any formal arrangement with the 
Communists, noting that he will “continue to work as we hold is best and 
95   It should be noted that throughout this period Croatian Communists in the U.S. described 
their efforts to forge alliances with non-Communists as one concerning the proletarian based 
“United Front” rather than the class-based “Popular Front.” No doubt this occurred because of 
the predominantly working class membership of most Croatian organizations in the United 
States.
96   S. M. Loyen, “Za jedinstvo i napredak HBZ,” Radnički kalendar (Pittsburgh), 1939, p. 83. The 
Lovestonites took their name from Jay Lovestone, a former CPUSA leader expelled for his sup-
port of Bukharin.
97   “I ovo je previše,” Svijet (New York), 26 July 1934, p. 2. In an editorial the following month, 
Radnik claimed that Gršković wanted to remove the working class “from the political struggle 
between the fascist reaction and the working class in the [CFU], to separate it from the . . . the 
Left Wing, to separate it even from the Communist Party. This is the cowardly policy of an old 
cunning capitalist.” Quoted in “Traži svoj čast,” Svijet (New York), 9 August 1934, p. 2. In anoth-
er pamphlet, Lojen sarcastically labeled Gršković as a “ “friend” of the working man,” implying 
that he was no such thing. Loyen, Tko gradi, p. 13.
98   See, e.g., “Da li je jedan Srbin iz Hrvatske ‘pravoslavni Hrvat’ ili Srbin?,” Borba (Toronto), p. 
2; and J. Čičić, “Oni će krasti ako im se ne poviše plaće,” Radnik (Chicago), 15 February 1935, 
p. 2.
99   See., e.g., “Da li je hrvatski seljak svjestan kuda ga vodi kulačko-gospodska HSS,” Borba (To-
ronto), 21 December 1932, p. 2.
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most beneficial for the working people generally, and, thus, for our Croatian 
[people] in particular.”100 The Communists, however, found Gršković’s stand 
unsatisfactory. Writing in Radnik, Frank Borich argued that the Front could 
not be implemented through comradeship and friendship, but only through 
a specific program which, while not causing each organization to lose its 
independence, would obligate all to bring the program to fruition.101
Gršković, though, noted the impossibility of overcoming differences 
between various groups overnight to form a healthy organization. He believed 
that such a formal “United Front” would quickly dissolve since the Front would 
merely cause thousands of politically unconscious people to be bound together, 
not knowing what they wanted. “For these and other reasons, we remain at 
our previously stated position: that we previously had a united front which 
expressed itself and appeared when necessary through words and deeds to help 
the weak [and those] persecuted by hunger and lack of rights. Such a united 
front of consciousness and determination and sacrifice of our immigrants exists 
today as well . . . .”102 Gršković’s refusal to join with the Communists prompted 
a reaction from Stjepan Lojen, who asked, “Which road is the editor of Svijet 
taking? Is it the road of establishing a Croatian, popular anti-fascist front or 
the road of the leaders of the “Domobrans” who are against this movement?”103 
Gršković angrily responded that Lojen’s question obviously implied that if one 
did not favor the “United Front,” then one supported the Domobrans.104 He 
argued that the Communists wanted the exclusive right to “enlighten and free 
the Croatian people, using in [their] efforts, means and methods which we 
have never approved of . . . . We will rather be called enemies of the unity of 
the Croats than puppets in the hands of those using Croatia as a bargaining 
chip.”105
The HSS leaders had their own reasons for refusing the Communists’ 
offers to join their “United Front.” The Peasant Party could find some points of 
agreement with the Communists. However, the Peasant Party viewed itself as 
already constituting a “United Front” of the Croatian people and argued that 
the “United Front” represented a creature of the Soviet Union formed for the 
sole purpose of defending it against the rising power of the Nazis.106
100   “Čisti računi - dobri prijatelji,” Svijet (New York), 30 July 1936, p. 2.
101   “Da se razumijemo,” Svijet (New York), 20 August 1935, p. 2.
102   Ibid.
103   “Odgovor na pitanje,” Svijet (New York), 19 September 1936, p. 2 (quoting from Radnik, 11 
September 1936).
104   Ibid.
105   “Tko je za jedinstvo hrvatskog naroda?” - Part II, Svijet (New York), 29 September 1936, p. 2.
106   “Kakav ujedinjeni front?” Borba (Toronto), 17 March 1936, p. 2 (citing to Hrvatski glas); and 
S.K.M., “Još o ujedinjenom front,” Borba (Toronto), 31 March 1936, p. 2 (citing to Hrvatski glas). 
See also Anthony Rasporich, For a Better Life: A History of the Croatians in Canada (Toronto: 
McClelland and Stewart, Ltd., 1982), p. 159.
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A further blow at the efforts of Croatian Communists to effectuate the 
“United Front” came from the Croatian Circle. The Circle initially appeared 
enthusiastic. As early as December 1935, Milan Biljčević (also known as Billich 
and Bilić), a prominent Circlist and head of its National Croatian Bureau, 
responded to Communist overtures in an article in Hrvatksi list i Danica hrvatska, 
by calling for a united front against tyranny, reaction, fascism and all other 
forms of oppression and exploitation of the masses, particularly the Croatian 
masses.107 Ivan Krešić, editor of Hrvatski list i Danica hrvatska, also attended 
a February 1936 conference in Pittsburgh which established a “Patronate 
Committee” (Patronatski odbor) to assist political prisoners and minority 
groups in Yugoslavia.108 The Circle subsequently participated in a September 
1936 conference in Pittsburgh which brought together representatives of fifteen 
“United Committees” which had been established among various Croatian 
organizations in a number of cities in response to the call for a “United Front” 
(as further discussed below). However, at its Sixth Congress (or Zbor) on 12 and 
13 October 1936, the Circle’s leadership determined not to go forward. While 
its Congress simultaneously issued condemnations of Mussolini, Pavelić and 
Pavelić’s followers, the Circle determined that past attempts at forcing unity on 
disparate Croatian organizations merely led to disputes as each organization 
struggled to maintain its independence. The Circle did, however, recognize 
that its branches and members could to come to specific understandings 
with other organizations concerning specific issues.109 As Josip Kraja, a Circle 
leader, subsequently noted, while domestically Croatia had created unity in 
its political struggles against Belgrade, “he who speaks of a United Front of 
Croatians in Emigrant Croatia does not know either our circumstances or our 
people. Emigrant Croatia is thousands of miles away from unified Croatia [in 
the homeland]; if we can at times achieve unity [on certain issues and in certain 
locations,] we have achieved much.”110 Gršković could not conceal his glee 
calling the Circle’s decision the “end of the comedy” of the United Front.111
The biggest blow to Communist hopes, however, came in September 1936 
when the CFU’s Supreme Board, by a vote of nine to three, rejected a motion 
to call an All-Croatian Congress, bringing charges in the pages of Radnik that 
the CFU leadership was pro-fascist.112
107   “Raketirstvo i licemjerstvo “hrvatskih komunista u Americi,” Nezavisna Hrvatska Država 
(Pittsburgh), 11 May 1940, p. 3.
108    Ibid.
109   “Izjave VI Glavnog zbora Hrvatskog kola,” Hrvatski list i Danica Hrvatska (New York), 17 
October 1936, p. 1.
110   Josip Kraja, “Hrvatsko kolo i Ujedinjeni front,” Hrvatski list i Danica Hrvatska (New York), 
15 December 1936, p. 2.
111   “Žalosni svršetak jedne komedije,” Svijet (New York), 21 October 1936, p. 2.
112   “Žalosni svršetak,” p. 2. Kratki pregled, p. 73, contains the text of the proposed resolution.
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The Communists, however, remained unbowed by these defeats. Whether 
through their efforts or not, the CFU Supreme Board in March 1937 adopted 
a series of resolutions which the Communists argued placed the CFU on the 
“progressive” side of the struggle against fascism. The resolutions included ones 
supportive of the Croatian people’s struggle for their freedom, of industrial 
unionization and of the Republican cause in the on-going civil war in Spain.113 
The Communists hailed these resolutions, noting that they represented a break 
in the decades long opposition of the organization to undertaking any political 
or religious discussions by its members. If carried out, the Communists argued 
that the resolutions would put the CFU “in the vanguard of those popular 
forces which are carrying out the battle against the fascist reaction and war 
mongers, for freedom and democratic rights of peoples [and] for peace.”114
The Communists further achieved some success in working with individual 
branches and members of the Croatian Circle in creating local United Front 
organizations known as “United Committees.” The Communists established 
these Committees in several localities, the most important of which included 
Detroit, with 26 participating organizations, Milwaukee, with 23, Chicago, with 
26, and New York with 21.115 In addition, forty CFU lodges in the Pittsburgh 
area formed a “United Lodges” committee.116 Milan Biljčević, who also presided 
over the local New York Committee, headed a national central committee 
established to unite these city-based Committees.117 These Committees did 
little of importance on a national scale but rather focused their energies on 
such matters as fund raising for various causes as well as socializing, seen 
as a means of increasing political participation. The United Committees 
proved instrumental in organizing the celebration of “Croatian Days.” These 
celebrations had initially been promoted by the CFU Supreme Board which 
urged its lodges to choose a day over the summer on which immigrants could 
113   “Rezolucije usvojene na polugodišnjem zasjedanje mjeseca ožujka 1937,” Zajedničar (Pitts-
burgh), 31 March 1937, pp. 2-3.
114   “Odlukoma Glavnog odbora Hrvatske bratske zajednice,” Radnički glasnik (Chicago), 7 April 
1937, Section 1, pp. 2 and 4.
115   One needs to approach these numbers with caution as many of these organizations probably 
had been under Communist control (as an example, the number of organizations could have 
included multiple IWO lodges, CFU lodges under Party control or influence, Workers’ Clubs 
etc.).
116   “Barjaktari jedinstva hrvatskog naroda,” Svijet (New York), 24 April 1937. Gršković saw the 
links brought about by these various Committees as a backhanded way for the Communists to 
organize an alternative to the All-Croatian Congress which they had previously failed to estab-
lish. “Tko nebi poznao, skup bi ih prodao,” Svijet (New York), 4 July 1937, p. 2.
117   On Biljčević, see Mato Batorović, “Biljčević, Milan,” in Hrvatski biografski leksikon (Zagreb: 
Jugoslavenski leksikografski zavod, 1983), vol. 1, pp. 772-73. See also “Financijalno izvješće 
središnjeg odbora Hrvatskih društva New Yorku,” Svijet (New York), 26 June 1937, p. 2.
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publicly celebrate their Croatian heritage. The United Committees seized on 
the proposal, and, thanks to their efforts, organized many Croatian Days in 
the United States.118
These successes proved limited. Despite Biljčević’s support for the United 
Front, only one branch of the Circle, Circle No. 1 Eugen Kvaternik based in 
New York City, joined a “United Front” grouping with the Communists. Even 
that success turned out to be short-lived as that branch withdrew from the 
“Front” by October 1937.119
Over the 4 July 1937 Independence Date holiday, the Croatian Section held 
its Second Conference, this one in Chicago.120 Lojen delivered a long analysis of 
the work of the Section since its last Conference, one which remained upbeat. 
He noted that for the first time “brotherly” relations had been established 
among different Croatian groups and organizations who in the past had seen 
one another as enemies. “Today we see the beginnings of unity in all larger 
communities in the form of unifying Croatian Days and in other brotherly 
cooperation.”121 Lojen noted that the CFU was no longer fraught with internal 
squabbling and described its support of the industrial unionization drives as a 
positive turning point.
Lojen responded to some of those who rejected the Communists’ calls to 
join the “United Front.” Lojen viewed the HSS’s claims to already be a front of 
the Croatian people as silly in light of the HSS’s weak organizational strength 
in North America and the HSS’s own policies in the homeland where the HSS 
had joined with other opposition political parties in a Peasant-Democratic 
Opposition (Seljačka-demokratska opozicija). Lojen noted that Gršković 
argued in favor of unity but he did nothing about it, making criticisms from 
his pedestal. As for the Domobrans, while one could not work with their 
organization, Lojen pointed to the fact that its members remained potential 
recruits to the “United Front” as they had been engaged in actions and strikes 
with other workers; approaching them could lead them to “shake off ” their 
118   Milan Biljčević, “Iseljenici za slobodu stare domovine,” Matica iseljenički kalendar, 1961, p. 
97.
119   See “Tko su sve u komunističkom frontu,” Hrvatski list i Danica Hrvatska (New York), 19 
October 1937, p. 3.
120   This Conference saw yet another foreign emissary attend, Stjepan Cvijić, the former General 
Secretary of the Communist Youth International. Cvijić had been sent to the U.S. to assist in 
the recruitment of Croatian-American volunteers for the International Brigades in Spain. On 
Cvijić’s work in the U.S., see Ivan Očak, Braća Cvijići (Zagreb: Spektar-Globus, 1982), pp. 427-
50. Cvijić was known under the pseudonym Stjepan Livadić. During his stay in the U.S., Cvijić 
worked closely with Lojen, in preparing Lojen’s three hour report opening the Conference. An-
drija Josipović, “Uspomene na Stjepana Lojen,” Narodni glasnik (Chicago), 31 January 1968, p. 6. 
Josipović attended the Conference as a representative of the Croatian Educational Alliance, the 
Communist-led movement among Croatian-Canadians.
121   S.M. Loyen, Komunisti i jedinstvo Hrvata u Americi (Chicago: Hrvatska radnička knjižara, 
1937), p. 36.
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fascist leadership.122
In moving the “United Front” forward, Lojen urged that the work of 
the Communists needed to go beyond the organization of Croatian Days. 
Their greatest weakness remained the lack of strong ties with the American 
progressive movement and of concrete proposals for everyday activities.123 
But the CFU remained the most important issue. “Without the CFU, one 
cannot create unity among American-Croatians.”124 Lojen remained hopeful of 
bringing the CFU on board due to its March 1937 resolutions and its support 
of unionization which caused the organization to place “itself on the side of 
progress [and] against reaction.”125
But many non-Communists remained unconvinced, some being 
particularly irked at the Communists’ adoption of the Croatian label. The 
right-wing Domobrans sarcastically commented that:
the Communists, when they [cover themselves] with the 
Croatian name, do not do so because they hold Croatianism 
dear, but because, under the Croatian name, they can more 
easily trick and lead on a byway every true Croat whom 
they catch in their web. Some Communists, who now hide 
under the Croatian label, until recently called themselves 
Yugoslavs and hated and threw all sorts of curses at all Croats 
who [with pride and spirit spoke the Croatian name]. For 
the Communists, it does not matter what name they call 
themselves. Yesterday they called themselves Yugoslavs, 
today they call themselves Croats, and tomorrow they may 
call themselves Japanese, Chinese, etc.126
The Circlist paper, Hrvatski list i Danica hrvatska, argued that the 
Communists had been nothing more than international racketeers, who 
operated under the cover of Croatianism to exploit the Croatian worker, 
reminding its readers that only a few years before one Croatian-American 
Communist (Mary Mrnjec of Chicago) publicly sat on a Croatian flag while 
Stjepan Lojen was quoted as saying that “he couldn’t give a damn about 
Croatianism.”127 Gršković also viewed the Communists’ transformation on the 
national question as hypocritical:
122   Ibid., pp. 51-53.
123   Ibid., p. 61.
124   Ibid., p. 63.
125   Ibid.
126   Luka Grbić, “Poruka od novog urednika,” Nezavisna hrvatska država (Pittsburgh), 31 De-
cember 1938, p. 4.
127   “Klasno svjesni Hrvati,” Hrvatski list i Danica Hrvatska (New York), 29 August 1940, p. 2.
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For over twenty years, they raised a world revolution 
using paper bombs and [attacked] everyone who did not 
nod their heads [in agreement] and applaud with them. 
[T]hey called this consciousness and the awakening of 
the revolutionary spirit of the working masses. [N]ow, 
after they became over night greater Croats than all dead 
and living Croats, they want to give opinions and express 
condemnations from a high pedestal of what one can and 
cannot say and write about anything which concerns our 
people”s life here and in the Old Country.128
The Communists clearly failed in their work to create a “United Front” 
in accordance with Comintern directives. Not one Croatian-American 
organization agreed to join hands with the Communists as they disagreed with 
both their political ideology and distrusted their motives.
Despite this, the period after the VIIth Comintern Congress saw a steady 
increase in Communist influence in the Croatian-American community. One 
can hypothesize that by discarding the dogmatism of the “Third Period” the 
Communists made themselves more accessible to working class Croatian-
Americans who did not understand or did not want to engage in the minutiae 
of Stalinist doctrine concerning a supposed pending revolution. Their concerns 
were more immediate, focused on keeping their jobs and increasing their living 
standards.
The Communists’ work on unionization drives during the second half of 
the 1930s clearly helped in bridging the prior gap between Party members and 
the workers they claimed to lead. During the “Third Period,” the Comintern 
advocated “dual unionism” in which the Communists established their own 
“revolutionary” unions in opposition to established, reformist unions. As 
noted above, Croatian-American Communist leaders such as Frank Borich 
and Anton Gerlach played important roles in these unions. But these unions 
proved to be utter failures.
The Comintern’s turn to the new “United Front” in the mid-1930s brought 
a change in tactics on union matters. The Communists disbanded their unions 
and began to work within mainstream unions, especially for the Conference 
128   “U svijetlu istine,” Svijet (New York), 23 January 1938, p. 2. The Communists also alien-
ated the then small Croatian-American intellectual community when they came out forcefully 
against proposals for the CFU to establish a Croatian university chair and a higher school for 
education of Croatian-American children. The Communists argued that this would not benefit 
the masses but only a privileged few. F. Preveden, “Zločin komunista nad hrvatskom omladi-
nom,” Hrvatski list i Danica hrvatska (New York), 23 November 1940, p. 3. That Francis Preve-
den made this proposal may have caused the Communists to automatically raise opposition as 
Preveden had previously been a Party member and an editor of Radnik for a short period in 
1924. Lojen, Uspomene, p. 120.
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(later Congress) of Industrial Organizations (CIO).129 The opportunity for 
collective bargaining and unionization provided by “New Deal” legislation 
(which the Communists ironically had previously condemned) allowed the 
Communists to apply their honed organizational skills to the mass unionization 
drives which swept through the Croatian-American community in the latter 
part of the decade.
Whatever the opinions Croatian-Americans had on the “United Front,” 
their leaders practically all enthusiastically endorsed unionization. Thus, 
when the Steel Workers Organizing Committee (SWOC) decided to turn to 
the ethnic fraternal groups for support in their drive to unionize the steel 
industry, Butković took the lead and became head of the fraternal section of the 
SWOC.130 These actions and their continued work within CFU lodges showed 
results - by March 1938, the Communists claimed control over approximately 
forty percent of all CFU lodges.131
The CFU leadership must have been aware of this rising Communist 
presence and appear to have made efforts to win support from members who 
had been influenced by the Communists. Thus, Butković agreed to attend a 
number of speaking events organized by the Communists during the latter 
1930s, something that would have been unheard of earlier in the decade. 
Butković also agreed with the Communists to participate in the establishment 
of an All-Slavic Congress (the forerunner of the American Slav Congress 
formed during World War II) and Butković acted as president of its organizing 
committee.132
The approaching CFU’s Fifth Convention scheduled for September 1939 
must have weighed on Butković’s mind in taking such actions. Indeed, in 
March 1939, a full six months prior to the convention, the CFU’s leadership 
announced the formation a bloc in preparation for assembly.133 The Communists 
came well-prepared, their “Progressive” Bloc now rechristened as the “New 
Deal National Bloc.” While Butković succeeded in being reelected as President 
during the Convention, the shift toward the left was perceptible as the leftists 
obtained an increased presence on the CFU”s Supreme Board.134
129   The CIO, originally a part of the American Federation of Labor, had been established to 
encourage unionization on an industry-wide rather than on a craft-basis.
130   Rachleff, “Class, Ethnicity,” p. 95.
131   Glazer, The Social Background, p. 232, n. 78, citing to materials found in the papers of Earl 
Browder in Syracuse University.
132   Serbian-American Communist Stevan Dedijer headed the press committee for the Com-
mittee. “Pripreme za Nacionalni Sve-Slavenski Kongres u toku,” Svijet (New York), 17 January 
1939, p. 2.
133   “Pred petu konvenciju Hrvatske bratske zajednice,” Hrvatski svijet (New York), 16 May 1939, 
p. 1.
134   Ivan Senica, “Tko je iznio pobjedu na konvenciji H.B.Z.,” Hrvatski svijet (New York), 26 
September 1939, p. 2.
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Conclusion
The next two years marked a tumultuous time in the activities of Croatian-
American Communists. The 1939 Stalin-Hitler Pact destroyed overnight 
the “United Front.” Mimicking Moscow’s new propaganda line, Croatian-
American Communists (and their comrades in the CPY) no longer viewed 
fascism and Nazism as an immediate threat. The Nazi invasion of Poland and 
the declaration of war against Germany by France and Great Britain became 
an “imperialist war” that the workers needed to oppose, not one where the 
working people had to continue the struggle against the expansion of fascism. 
Obviously, the exigencies of Soviet foreign policy outweighed all sense of 
maintaining political constancy in one’s views. While we have not investigated 
to what extent these turn-arounds in Party tactics may have had on Croatian-
American members, their leadership clearly had no problem in mirroring the 
new Party-line.135
The invasion of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union and the entry of the U.S. 
in World War II no doubt saved Croatian-American Communists from the 
oblivion they faced had they been forced to remain wedded to their opposition 
to entry into the new “imperialist war.”
During World War II the prestige of Croatian Communists” increased as 
a result of their work in Croatian and Slavic American organizations in the 
United States and as a result of the advent of Marshall Tito in Yugoslavia. 
Immediately following World War II they had their greatest successes: a newly 
installed, seemingly popular government in their homeland, a daily newspaper 
in the United States (at that time called the Narodni glasnik) with a circulation 
of over 12,000, and, in 1947, the takeover by their allies of the CFU.
To a certain extent, their ultimate success had its roots in their work in the 
Croatian-American community in the late 1930s. True, Croatian-American 
Communists failed to implement the “United Front” tactics as then dictated 
by the Comintern. Their failure particularly comes into focus when compared 
to their Serbian-American colleagues whose Vidovdan Congress included a 
number of prominent non-Communists.136
135   See, e.g., Leo Fisher, “Imperijalistički rat,” Radnički kalendar (Pittsburgh), 1940, pp. 17-31; 
and Franjo Borić, “Potreba jedinstva radničke klase u borbi protiv rata,” Radnički kalendar 
(Pittsburgh), 1940, pp. 33-39.
136   Though the major Serbian-American fraternal organization, the Serbian National Federa-
tion, kept its distance from the Communists. Koča Jončić, “Iseljeništvo – Srbija, SR,” in Encik-
lopedija Jugoslavije (Zagreb: Jugoslavenski leksikografski zavod Miroslav Krleža, 1988), vol. 5, 
pp. 603-08. Importantly, the Communists continued to retain majority control over the Vidov-
dan Congress. Prica, Amerika, p. 19. Their failure may not have only been ideological, as Don 
Niko Gršković, who shared many of their ideals, simply could not work with people who wrote 
in such disparaging tones in their newspaper. Gršković pointed to the writings of Slobodni mis-
ao, the Croatian Communist paper in Canada, as a marked contrast with the writings one found 
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Nevertheless, Communist tactics ultimately succeeded. By concentrating 
their work on the CFU and its individual, autonomous lodges, they in practice 
implemented the old, discarded “United Front” tactic of the “Third Period” 
of “boring from within.” While this may not have been a conscious or even 
necessarily a desirable choice, they ultimately succeeded in having their allies 
obtain control of the largest Croatian-American organization and, indeed, one 
of the largest Croatian organizations in the world.
in Radnički glasnik, arguing that perhaps this reflected the fact the writers of the former were 
young men, while those of the latter had their political and class education in what he called the 
“Chicago School.” “Pozdrav i odgovor,” Svijet (New York), 15 February 1938, p. 2.
Kroatische abteilung der Kommunistischen Partei der Vereinigten 
Staaten von amerika und “Vereinigte front” (1934-1939)
Zusammenfassung
In diesem Artikel wird Versuch der Implementierung der “Vereinigten 
Front” in den Rahmen kroatisch-amerikanischer Gemeinschaft dargestellt. Der 
Verfasser beschreibt die Entwicklung sozialistischer und kommunistischer Or-
ganisation innerhalb der kroatisch-amerikanischen Gemeinschaft bis zu Mitte 
der 1930-er Jahre und bespricht wichtige Veränderungen, die zur Gründung 
der Kroatischen Abteilung der Kommunistischen Partei der Vereinigten Staat-
en geführt haben. Er erörtert auch die Zusammenarbeit der genannten Abtei-
lung mit anderen nicht kommunistisch orientierten kroatisch-amerikanischen 
Gruppen in ihrem Trachten nach Bildung der “Vereinigten Front”.
Während kroatisch-amerikanische Kommunisten nicht sehr zahlreich in 
der Kommunistischen Partei der Vereinigten Staaten in 1930-er Jahren waren, 
spielten sie in der zweiten Hälfte dieses Jahrzehntes eine bedeutende Rolle in-
nerhalb eigener kroatischer Gemeinschaft.
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